The first hurdle : special circumstances in the Child Support Act 1991 by Holden, Antony William.
THE FIRST HURDLE - SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
THE CHILD SUPPORT ACT 1991 
ANTONY WILLIAM HOLDEN 
«ll1'Tr>'UTTTED FOR THE LLB (HONOURS) DEGREE AT 
A UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
e MBER 1993 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
H726 
1993 
IN 
! 
b 
CTI 
'Z-
'J 
:y, . 
~ 
_, 
:::r 
~ 
J? 
~ ~ 
5 
<r= 
-; 
~ 
~ -
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
• • • 
Ill 
I 
I 
• • • 
Ill 
I 
I 
CONTENTS 
I INTRODUCTION 
II THE LEGISLATION 
III POLICY AND OBJECTS OF THE ACT 1991 
IV "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" IN OTHER LEGISLATION 
V "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" BEFORE THE HIGH COURT 
DECISION IN REM 
VI "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" IN THE HIGH COURT -
THE APPEAL OF REM 
VII THE FAMILY COURTS AFTER REM - THE APPLICATION 
OF THE HIGH COURT DECISION 
VIII THE HIGH COURT REVISITED - PATRICK V BOXEN 
AND WILCOX V LYON 
IX CONCLUSION 
1 
3 
3 
7 
14 
21 
30 
38 
43 
• 
Ill 
Ill 
I 
Ill 
Ill 
1 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Child Support Act 1991 radically revises the law relating 
to child maintenance. In essence it is a financial statute 
which ignores wider guardianship issues. 1 The Act replaces the 
discretionary principles in section 72 of the Family 
Proceedings Act 1980, and the assessment procedures for 
contributions 2 in the Social Security legislation, with a 
single philosophy and procedure: a formula assessment of 
liability by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue. By providing 
"legislatively fixed standards " 3 , Parliament has chosen to 
"decide definitively itself what used to be decided by the 
Court under the Family Proceedings Act 1980." 4 
The Act is a major attempt to ensure substantial uniformity of 
liability based on a liable parent's income after due credit 
for a basic living allowance. The living allowance is based on 
the invalid or unemployment benefit with increases in the rate 
allowed if the liable parent has a heterosexual 5 partner or 
additional children from the new relationship. The actual 
assessment is based on a percentage of the child support 
income. 6 The percentage increases depending on the number of 
children cared for by the custodial parent. Formula based 
assessments are evident in other jurisdictions but the New 
Zealand Act is modelled closely on the Child Support 
(Assessment) Act 1989 from Australia . In supplanting the old 
1 Stuckey v Stuckey Unreported, 21 September 19 92 , Family 
Court Napier CS 041/122/92, 12. 
2 The former Liable Pare nt Contribution scheme. 
3 Section 4(f) Child Support Act 1991. 
4 Re M [1992) NZFLR 660, 662 Judge Keane. 
5 Thus the formula inherently penalizes those who are in 
homosexual relationships. 
6 Taxable income derived from the last relevant income year 
minus a living allowance, see sections 29 and 30. 
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liable parent contribution scheme and that of the Family 
Proceedings Act with the Australian based legislatively fixed 
standards, the government has sent a clear message that the 
test of success is "the extent to which the scheme raises 
money. " 7 The Act assumes that liable parents are not paying 
enough and can pay a lot more, both towards the states 
provision of the domestic purposes benefit, and to earning 
custodial parents. In this sense the reform is motivated by 
"fiscal exigencies." 8 
Both the transfer of control from the Department of Social 
Welfare to Inland Revenue, and the imposition of a strict 
formula based assessment shows the government is serious about 
collecting a "fair contribution"
9 from liable parents. Inherent 
in the application of a generalized and fixed standard is that 
in many situations the parties may feel that the formula 
assessment has not taken account of their particular 
circumstances. However, departure from a formula assessment can 
only be obtained by application to the Family Court and only 
then if the applicant makes it over three hurdles.
10 The first 
of these hurdles, and the one to be discussed in detail here, 
is that in relation to one or more of the grounds for departure 
in section 105 (2), an applicant must show the existence of 
"special circumstances". 
7 W R Atkin "Financial Support: The Bureaucratization of 
Personal Responsibility" in Henaghan and Atkin(eds) Family Law 
Policy in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992) 
213. 
8 Above n7, 213. 
9 Above n3, s4(j) 
10 Various New Zealand child support cases have stated that 
to be successful in a departure order, the applicant must show 
cumulatively that a ground per s105 exists with "special 
circumstances", that an order is "just and equitable" and finally 
that it is "otherwise proper" to grant such an application. See 
above n4, 665. 
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II THE LEGISLATION 
The available grounds for departure are set out in section 
105(2). In all there are ten grounds broken down into three 
subgroups. Each subgroup is prefaced by the requirement for the 
applicant to prove "special circumstances":-
105 (2) (a) That, by virtue of special circumstances ... 
(b) That, in the special circumstances of the 
case ... 
(c) That, by virtue of special circumstances ... 
11 
In addition section 105 provides qualifiers and guidelines for 
the interpretation of several of the grounds outlined in 
section 105(2) . 12However, nowhere in the Act is the meaning or 
interpretation of "special circumstances" expanded or defined. 
Thus, judges in the Family Court have had to interpret the 
phrase themselves in the context of the policy and objects of 
the statute, any relevant case law, and based on their own 
feelings of fairness and justice. 13 
III POLICY AND OBJECTS OF THE CHILD SUPPORT ACT 1991 
An important focus of the Act is the recove~y of debt and the 
government's drive to receive a more significant renumeration 
for the outlay of the domestic purposes benefit. 
14 This is 
11 The differences in the drafting of subparagraphs (a), 
(b), and (c) is discussed below at Part VI. 
12 See ssl05 (3), 105 (4), 105 (5) and 105 (6) 
13 Judge Inglis QC in G v G and Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue Unreported, 29 September 1992, Family Court Napier CS 
041/182/92, 5. 
14 The estimated annual cost for the 99,477 people receiving 
the domestic purposes benefit is just over one billion dollars, 
see D McLoughlin "Act of Injustice: the Child Support Act" North 
111 
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evident not only from the imposition of the scheme itself but 
also significantly in the transfer of control of the scheme 
from the Department of Social Welfare to Inland Revenue. 
The "fiscal drive" 15 of the legislation is reflected in 
several of the stated objectives contained in section 4: 
(e) To ensure that parents with a like capacity to provide 
financial support for their children should provide 
like amounts of financial support 
(f) To provide legislatively fixed standards in accordance 
with which the level of financial support is to be 
provided by parents for their children should be 
determined 
(j) To ensure that the costs to the State of providing an 
adequate level of financial support for children and 
their custodians is offset by the collection of a 
fair contribution from non custodial parents. 
Judge MacCormick in Cheer v Cheer16 felt that the above three 
objectives were explicit evidence that "in essence the new 
legislation is a financial statute. " 17 
Various Members of Parliament in debating the Child Support 
Bill claimed it was an affirmation of children's rights and 
also that it promoted fairness and equity between the parents 
and South, June 1993, 46, 49. 
15 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates No 35, 1991: 5990, Hon 
Clive Matthewson MP. 
16 Unreported, 7 November 1992, Family Court Gisborne FP 
016/183/92, 2-3. 
17 Above n16, 2-3. 
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of those children. 18 Although several of the objects in 
section 4 may be cited as supporting this rhetoric, perhaps one 
thing that is apparent is that the objectives viewed 
collectively "fail to produce a clear statement of legislative 
policy. " 1 9 Many of the objects are value laden and range from 
broad statements about the relationship between parents and 
children to the underlying mechanics of the Act. 
Despite the apparent contradictions in the Act's objectives 
Parliament did intend a formula based system that would 
establish the "fundamental principle that parents have a duty 
to support their children to the best of their ability. 
11 20 In 
this sense the Act aims to protect the financial interests of 
the child. 2 1 The words "to the best of their ability" as 
reflected in objective 4(j), "a fair contribution", suggests 
tests of fairness and equity and imply some careful evaluation 
of each case on its merits. However, this is contradictory to 
the basic premise of a formula based scheme, namely that the 
general formula can be applied across the board to all liable 
parents. 22 For, "while the formula, like the tax system, takes 
account of basic differences in income, it does not allow for 
an assessment of an individual's specific needs and 
outgoings. " 2 3 
Thus, although some of the objects may give a sense that the 
18 Several important issues such as the rights of children 
under the Act; parental responsibility; sensitivity to Maori 
and Pacific Island issues and the position of non-birth parents 
will not be discussed here. But see Above n7, 217-219. 
19 w R Atkin "Departure Orders 
lawyers" (1992) 3 Fam Law Bull 94, 95. 
a benefit match for 
20 Above n15, No 25 Hon Roger McClay MP, 4385. 
2 1 The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 27 August 1993, 
5. 
22 Above n7, 218. 
23 Above n7, 218. 
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Act is fair and equitable, these broad statements contradict 
the body of the legislation which is more accurately reflected 
in object (f), that the Act provides stringent "legislatively 
fixed standards." 
The only time when individual concerns come into consideration, 
and the only time Parliament intended them to come into 
consideration, is with the departure order. Departure orders 
are "designed to be the exception rather than the rule"
24
, 
particularly as object (g) reinforces the principle that 
custodians should be able to obtain support without the need 
to resort to Court proceedings. 25 The departure process is a 
stringent three step one where the applicant is required not 
only to show a specified ground for departure with "special 
circumstances", but also that an order would be both "just and 
equitable" and "otherwise proper". Such a three tiered test 
indicates that departure orders are not to be granted lightly. 
Perhaps some of Parliament's intention behind the use and place 
of the departure order can be taken from the presentation of 
the Report of the Social Services Committee to the House by 
Bill English MP where he said26 
The Bill has a basic discretionary element, and that is the 
departure order that the court may make. That is a safety-
valve for situations in which the formula is obviously 
unjust - it provides some scope for assessments that are 
regarded as unfair .... We changed the legal requirements 
in departure orders so that circumstances no longer have 
24 Above n7, 218. 
25 But see the obiter comments of Judge Inglis QC in Tapara 
v Liddall and CIR Unreported, 10 December 1992, Family Court 
New Plymouth CS 043/027/91, 6, where His Honour says "s4 (g) 
cannot possibly be interpreted as indicating as a legislative 
objective that Court proceedings on child support issues are 
generally to be avoided, so reinforcing the sanctity of the 
formula assessment, when it is expressly provided that the only 
means by which a liable parent can attack a formula assessment 
is by proceedings in Court." 
26 Above nlS, 5987. 
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to be extraordinary; they only have to be special. That 
gives the judges some discretion, but does not lock them 
into not being able to make any decisions at all. 
IV "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" IN OTHER LEGISLATION 
The 
leading case in New Zealand, prior to the introduction of the 
Child Support legislation, on the interpretation and 
application of "special circumstances" was the Court of Appeal 
decision in Cortez Investments Ltd v Olphert & Collins.
27 That 
case dealt with an application for revision of a bill of costs 
rendered by solicitors who had acted for the company Cortez. 
The bill was revised and reduced by the Wellington District Law 
Society but on the same day as being advised of the result, the 
company instructed its solicitors to give notice of appeal to 
the High Court. This notice was out of time under section 148 
of the Law Practitioners Act 1982. Cortez Investments Ltd then 
applied to the District Court under section 146 for a further 
revision. Section 151 of the Law Practitioners Act provides 
that when a bill of cost had been previously revised, the Court 
should not make an order referring a bill for revision except 
in "special circumstances". 
In the High Court the Judge refused the application, holding 
that no special circumstances existed for it had not been shown 
that their was a serious risk of injustice to the Company if 
the bill was not referred for revision. 
The Court of Appeal overruled Ongley J holding that the serious 
risk of prejudice test was too stringent. This was because the 
context of the legislation called for a wider construction of 
"special circumstances" than the serious risk of prejudice test 
allowed. Rather it was a question of where the interests of 
27 [1984) 2 NZLR 434. 
• • 
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justice lay in all the circumstances. 
In his judgment McMullin J, pointed out the important proviso 
that: 28 
What are "special circumstances" must be considered against the 
statutory background in which they are used ... apart from 
observations of general principle, decisions under one statute 
are not likely to be of much relevance to another. 
All three judges looked at the context, object and policy of 
the statute holding that it was a "commendable example of 
legislative consumer protection"
29which was "directed to the 
assessment of the fairness and reasonableness of bills of costs 
in the public interest. 1130 
Woodhouse P stated that such a liberal enactment "deserves and 
is intended to be given an appropriately liberal 
interpretation " 31 and that it was not wise for the Court to 
lay down principles or interpretations which could only have 
the effect of fettering the Court's discretion. The President 
concluded that one way of looking at the test in the present 
statutory context was that "special circumstances" may be met 
"where aspects of the facts seem to indicate a problem with 
relatively unusual features or reasonably deserving at the same 
time relief of the kind provided by the provision. "
32 
Richardson J held that it was a question of where the interests 
of justice lay in all the circumstances. He cited Re Norman
33 
as authority for the proposition that "special circumstances" 
28 Above n27, 441. 
29 Above n27, 437 per Woodhouse p. 
30 Above n27, 439 per Richardson J. 
31 Above n27, '137. 
32 Above n27, 437. 
33 (1886) 16 QBD 673, 677. 
• 
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are "wide, comprehensive and flexible words." Richardson J 
reasoned that synonyms such as "unusual", "out of the ordinary 
run", "uncommon", "abnormal" and "striking" convey the same 
flavour but really add nothing to the meaning of "special 
circumstances" except to emphasise that "'special' is something 
less than extraordinary or unique. " 34 Importantly he concluded 
that the inquiry into special circumstances never called for 
"the mechanical application of a rigid set of criteria. The 
interests of justice must govern. " 35 
McMullin J after stating the caution as to the relevance of 
decisions under other statutes, went on to reason that because 
the circumstances are special to each case, "a judgment on 
whether or not they exist will often be a value judgment on the 
facts. " 36 He felt that to be 'special', the circumstances must 
be "abnormal, uncommon or out of the ordinary. "
37 
The appeal was allowed. The Court held that the combination of 
the Company's clearly stated dissatisfaction with the District 
Law Society's decision and the mistake on the part of the 
Company's solicitors amounted to "special circumstances". 
The Court of Appeal's interpretations of "special 
circumstances" are problematic and not entirely consistent. 
Both Woodhouse P and McMullin J give some indication of how to 
interpret "special circumstances in their references 
respectively to "relatively unusual features" and "abnormal, 
uncommon or out of the ordinary." But Richardson J sees these 
synonyms as really adding nothing to the meaning of "special 
circumstances" except to establish a standard less than 
extraordinary. 
34 Above n27, 439. 
35 Above n27, 439. 
36 Above n27, 441. 
37 Above n27, 441. 
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What was consistent through the three judgments was that the 
"interests of justice" are the governing criteria. For 
Woodhouse P referred to features "reasonably deserving of 
relief"; Richardson J to the "interests of justice" and 
McMullin J stated that the test was really "a value judgment 
on the facts." 
As a test for "special circumstances" these criteria are not 
that useful. Firstly this was because the Judges' comments were 
obviously coloured by the nature of the statute they were 
dealing with. That is, that the Act inherently embodies 
concepts of "justice" as the legislation is aimed at an 
assessment of the fairness and reasonableness of bills of 
costs. Secondly, that the test offers minimal guidance for 
subsequent cases as in reality it emphasises little more than 
that "special circumstances" gives judges a discretion to make 
a value judgment on the facts. 
Other cases have come before the Courts dealing with the 
interpretation of "special circumstances" (or similar phrases) 
in the context of various pieces of legislation. In the case 
of Anderson v Transport Department38 when considering a 
disqualification for dangerous driving and "special reasons" 
under section 30 of the Transport Act 1962, Hardie Boys J held 
that "this was a curious offence of a kind not ordinarily met 
with", 39 thus justifying a reduction in the statutory 
disqualification from 12 months to 3 months. 
In another case 40 under the Transport Act 41 , Adams J in 
considering whether the reasons advanced amounted to ''special 
38 
[ 19 6 4 ] NZ LR 8 8 3 • 
39 Above n38, 885. 
40 Profitt V Police [1957] NZLR 468. 
41 This time under the Transport Act 1949. 
11 
reasons" under section 41, held that it was not necessary that 
the considerations advanced should be "overwhelming. . . . The 
reasons must, of course, be 'special', and not such as are 
common to the ordinary run of cases. " 42 It is a question 
whether the reasons advanced are of sufficient importance and 
"sufficiently unusual. " 43 
In MAF v Schofield44 where the defendant failed to make the 
required monthly management reports, Fraser J, in the context 
of section 107(c) (1) of the Fisheries Act 1983, reasoned that 
special in this context means "something exceptional not 
general, not found in the common run of cases. " 45 
A similar conclusion was reached as to the meaning of "special 
circumstances" in section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985. 
In relation to that Act, Thorp J in Edwards v Police 4
6 said, 
"before any circumstance can be brought into account it must 
be a 'special' circumstance, not such as arises in the ordinary 
case. " 47 
These observations as to "special circumstances" can be 
highlighted by comparison with the Court of Appeal decision in 
Martin v Martin. 48 There the Court had to decide on the 
division of matrimonial property following a separation. 
Section 14 of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 provides an 
42 Above n40, 470. 
43 Above n40, 470. 
44 [1990) 1 NZLR 210. 
45 Above n44, 221. 
46 [1986] BCL 615. 
47 Above n46, 615. 
48 [1979] 1 NZLR 97 .This case 
reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in 
NZLR 687; Hebberd v Hebberd [1992) 
Johansen (1993) 10 FRNZ 302. 
has more recently been 
Wilson v Wilson [1991) 1 
3 NZLR 51 7 and Joseph v 
• 
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exception to the general rule that the matrimonial home and 
chattels should be shared equally. It established that if there 
were "extraordinary circumstances" that rendered equal sharing 
"repugnant to justice" then the normal presumption of equal 
division could be avoided. It is clear that the phrase 
"repugnant to justice" colours the context but the judges' 
observations are still useful. 
Woodhouse J thought that the phrase "extraordinary 
circumstances" referred to49 
circumstances that must not only be remarkable in degree but 
also unusual in kind. It is vigorous and powerful language ... 
and I am satisfied that it has been chosen quite deliberately 
to limit the exceptions to those abnormal situations that 
will demonstrably seem truly exceptional and which by their 
nature are bound to be rare. 
Cooke J said that the test was a stringent one, more so than 
"special circumstances". Like Richardson J he followed the 
reasoning of Quilliam J in Castle v Castle50 who saw 
"extraordinary circumstances" as forcing the Court to say that 
the particular case is so out of the ordinary that an equal 
division is something that the Court simply cannot 
countenance. 51 
With the backdrop of these New Zealand cases the Family Court 
approached the meaning of "special circumstances" in the Child 
Support Act. However, it was the Australian Courts that many 
New Zealand judges have followed. 
Judge Keane in one of the first New Zealand Child Support 
decisions said, "(t) he Act is modelled on the Australian 
Support (Assessment) Act 1989, and decisions under that 
49 Above n 48, 102. 
5 0 (1977] 2 NZLR 97, 102-103. 
51 Above nSO, 106. 
111 
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statute are illuminating. 1152 
The leading Australian case is Gyselman v Gyselman53 which has 
been drawn on heavily by a large body of the judiciary in the 
New Zealand Family Court. The Australian legislation has 
similar grounds for departure as the New Zealand Act. However 
unlike the New Zealand legislation, each of the categories of 
grounds for departure are prefaced by the words "in the special 
circumstances of the case" and none mention "by virtue of the 
special circumstances. " 54 
The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia held that 
"special circumstances" in the context of the Australian Act 
were as a generality intended to emphasise that the facts of 
the case must establish55 
something which is special or out of the ordinary. That is, the 
intention of the Legislature is that the Court will not 
interfere with the administrative formula result in the 
ordinary run of cases. 
The Full Court then went on to approve the approach of Kay J 
in Savery v Savery5 6 that "special circumstances" were "facts 
peculiar to the particular case which set it apart from other 
cases. " 57 
In essence then the conclusions as to "special circumstances" 
in the Australian Family Court are very similar to those of the 
New Zealand judiciary in a variety of legislation. 
52 Above n4, 662. 
53 (1992) FLC 79,065. 
54 See below Part VI. 
55 Above n53, 79,065. 
56 (1990) FLC 77,897. 
57 Above n56, 77,897. 
11 
II 
Il l 
I 
I 
14 
V "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" BEFORE THE HIGH COURT 
DECISION OF REM 
The Family Court in approaching the interpretation of "special 
circumstances" looked to the body of case law (particularly in 
Australia) which illuminated the meaning of the phrase and also 
to the objects, and the policy behind those objects, as 
expressed in the Act. Two principal interpretations emerged. 
The dominant line, and that accepted by the large majority of 
Family Court judges, 58 was that expres sect by Judge Keane in 
Re M. His Honour looked closely at the philosophy and the 
objects of the Act stating that "what sets this Act apart is 
object ( f) " 59 (legislatively fixed standards) . In the context 
of this observation, his Honour concluded that: 60 
The legislature has allowed for the possibility of departure 
from the formula answer, but only by a narrow gate. The formula 
answer . .. is clearly intended to be definitive in all but a few 
cases. (emphasis added) 
Judge Keane agreed with counsel for the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue that "special circumstances" must be something other 
than the grounds specified in section 105. For otherwise the 
reference to "special circumstances" would be redundant in the 
Act. 61 His Honour stated that the Child Support Act 1991 was 
58 See for example, the Principal Family Court Judge in DvD 
[1992) NZFLR 762; His Honour Judge Strettell in Flynn v Flynn 
Unreported, 10 August 1992, Family Court Christchurch FP 
009/692/92; His Honour Judge Carruthers in Richards v Richards 
Unreported, 28 October 1992, Family Court Lower Hutt FP 280/92. 
59 Above n4, 662. 
60 Above n4, 663. 
61 Above n4, 666. 
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modelled on the Australian system and thus the Australian case 
law was illuminating. In particular he looked at the 
Philippe, 62 Savery63 and Gyselman 64 approach which he adopted 
and followed. 65 Essentially this was the line that to be 
"special", the circumstances must show something out of the 
ordinary which set it apart from other cases. 
However, in his discussion of the meaning of "special 
circumstances", Judge Keane made some observations which could 
be regarded as imposing an even more stringent test than that 
in Gyselman. For he stated that 66 
There must be something remarkable about the circumstances of 
the applicant ... to be relevant the 'special circumstances' must 
take those consequences beyond the usual and make the applicants 
predicament more extreme than is common. (emphasis added) 
It was the stringency of the test as postulated in Re Mand the 
close identification with the Australian legislation and case 
law that the second principal interpretation of "special 
circumstances" disagreed with. Judge Inglis QC was the chief 
advocate of this alternative reasoning and his position is best 
postulated in the decision of H v G and CIR. 67 
Unlike Judge Keane, Judge Inglis QC saw significant differences 
between the New Zealand and Australian legislation and believed 
it was "unsafe to assume that Australian cases will necessarily 
assist in interpreting the New Zealand Act. " 68 Judge Inglis 
62 
( 1 9 7 8 ) F LC 9 0-4 3 3 , 7 7 2 0 2 . 
63 Above n56, 77,897. 
64 Above n53, 79,065. 
65 In particular His Honour Judge Keane relied on the 
passages quoted from Gyselman see above Part IV. 
66 Above n4, 666 and 667. 
67 [1992] NZFLR 861. 
68 Above n67, 865. 
I 
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QC's central premise for distinguishing the Australian line of 
interpretation focused on the nature of the formula itself. He 
reasoned that "the Australian statute bases the formula 
assessment on the income of both parents and because of that 
the interpretation of 'special circumstances' in Gyselman 
cannot be applied safely to the New Zealand statute. "
69 The 
New Zealand formula assessment used as its exclusive basis the 
income of the non-custodial parent. Thus, argued Judge Inglis 
QC, the formula assessment was intended as a benchmark only for 
cases in which the non-custodial parent is the sole income 
earner. "For other cases it can provide no more than a starting 
point. 117 0 
His Honour continued that it is not rational to apply slavishly 
a formula based on only one parent's financial situation to a 
case where the formula does not represent reality. Further, the 
situations where both parents are earning are by no means 
exceptional or uncommon. For these reasons Judge Inglis QC 
rejected the approach of Judge Keane which would allow 
departure orders only through a "narrow gate." He concluded 
that Parliament cannot have intended that "the departure 
provisions of section 105 should be approached narrowly or 
grudgingly" 71 and what Parliament did intend was that the 
formula assessment should be departed from "not in limited, but 
appropriate instances." 72 
The next step in the reasoning of Judge Inglis QC was as to the 
meaning of the phrase "special circumstances" itself. It was 
important, he argued, that in assessing whether "speci al 
circumstances" 
established 
exist, 
by the 
"to recognize that the norm is 
formula assessment provisions 
69 T v T Unreported Minute of Judge Inglis QC, 14 December 
1992, Family Court Hawera CS 021/141/92, 3. 
7 0 Above n67, 867. 
71 Above n67, 868. 
72 Above n 67, 868. 
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themselves. " 73 But that the norm as established by the New 
Zealand formula is of a more limited application than that in 
Australia because of the distinguishable statutory context. It 
is this distinction which Judge Inglis QC reasoned was not 
brought to the attention of Judge Keane or other Judges in the 
Family Court. Thus, he concluded that Re Mis distinguishable 
and that "special", in light of its primary dictionary meaning, 
was to be read as meaning "merely individual circumstances or 
particular circumstances " 74 
Although the distinction that Judge Inglis QC made was a valid 
one, the blindness of the New Zealand formula to the income of 
the custodial parent is in practice not a substantial ground 
for distinguishing the Australian statute. The Consultative 
group on the Child Support legislation in Australia recommended 
the inclusion of both parents income in the formula because it 
was concerned to avoid the situation where non-custodial 
parents were required to pay a significant proportion of their 
income in child support to a high income custodial parent. 75 
This was a valid concern at the time. However, the years since 
the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 came into force have 
shown that the proportion of cases registered with the 
Australian Child Support agency where the custodians income has 
in fact affected the level of liability, is less than two 
percent. 76 There is no evidence to suggest that the situation 
in New Zealand would be any different. Thus, Judge Inglis QC's 
argument may only be applicable in the very small proportion 
of cases where the custodial parent's income does affect the 
formula. Even here his argument is limited as the Act 
73 G v G Unreported, 2 9 September 1992, Family Court Napier 
CS 041/182/92, 5. 
74 Above n 67, 873. 
75 Child Support Evaluation Advisory Group Child Support 
in Australia: Final Report of the Evaluation of the Child 
Support Scheme (Commonwealth of Australia 1992) Vol 1, 225. 
76 Above n75, 225. 
I 
18 
specifically provides for the affect of the custodial parent's 
income to be a ground for departure.
77 
Judge Inglis QC and Judge Keane form the two principal poles 
of interpretation in the Family Court. Various judges expressed 
views which, either whole heartedly or in shades, followed the 
meaning of "special circumstances" postulated by these two 
judges. 78 
However, a third approach to the phrase "special circumstances" 
in the Child Support Act emerged just a month before the High 
Court appeal of Re M. The line of Judge Ellis in Bradey v 
Bradey and CIR79 does not go as far as Judge Inglis QC in 
undermining the decision in Re M, but places a different and 
important focus on "special circumstances" in the Child Support 
legislation. 
Judge Ellis's discussion of "special circumstances" was in the 
context of an application for departure under section 
105 (2) (c) (iii). 00 His Honour began by stating that such an 
occupation of the former matrimonial home by a separated spouse 
and children is not of itself unusual. 
81 In looking at a 
series of New Zealand cases where this ground had and had not 
77 See above n3, s105 (2) (c) (i). 
78 See above n, 58 for a cross-section of judges who 
support the Re M interpretation. Support for Judge Inglis QC' 
line of interpretation is significantly less but various judges 
including His Honour Judge Whitehead in Dingle v Dingle and CIR 
[1993] NZFLR 184, have applied both the 'lesser standard' of 
Judge Inglis QC and the Re M approach. 
79 Unreported, 6 November 1992, Family Court Dannevirke FP 
010/26/92. 
00 That is , because of the respondent's entitlement to 
occupy the home in which the applicant had a financial 
interest, the application of the formula assessment would 
result in an unjust and inequitable determination. 
81 Above n79, 9. 
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been established, Judge Ellis said that: 82 
What these, and other, cases illustrate is that each case must 
be determined on its own circumstances, but that relief cannot 
be provided unless there is something "special" about those 
circumstances. 
In stating this Judge Ellis agreed with Judge Carruthers in 
Simpson v Simpson 83 and Lewis v Lewis and CIR84 that the 
phrase "special circumstances" must be applied disjunctively 
to the financial consequences of the grounds and that the 
grounds themselves cannot constitute the special 
circumstances. 85 
Judge Ellis also considered closely the approach to "special 
circumstances" in other legislation by the courts. In 
particular he drew on the Court of Appeal decision in Cortez 
Investments Ltd. 86 He reasoned that the meaning of "special 
circumstances" is to be derived from the particular context and 
objects of the statute. 87 Importantly, Judge Ellis stressed 
that "over emphasis of the facts themselves may be to miss the 
point. " 88 It was here that he disagreed with Judge Inglis QC, 
stating that the "special circumstances" "must be more than the 
82 Above n79, 10. 
83 Unreported, September 1992, Family Court Masterton. 
84 Unreported, 1 October 1992, Family Court Blenheim FP 
006/202/89. 
85 Compare this with the early view of His Honour Judge 
MacCormick in Carey v Carey and CIR Unreported, 28 August 
1992, Family Court Auckland FP 004/1930/ 87, where he said at 
p7 that the three instances in slOS (2) (c) (i), (ii) and (iii) 
are "specific instances that might be considered special" that 
is, they establish "special circumstances" in themselves in 
terms of the Act. 
86 See above n2 7 . 
87 Above n79, 1 7. 
88 Above n79, 18. 
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particular facts of an individual case. "
89 For if Judge Inglis 
QC's standard was applied, then that did no more than judge 
each case on its merits without applying any qualifying 
threshold. Judge Ellis stated that every case in the Court was 
entitled to consideration on its merits but that "cannot 
discount the requirement that ... 
special about those particular 
there must be 
circumstances 
consequences before relief can be provided. 
1190 
something 
or their 
His Honour returned to the "Pierian Spring of Gyselman"
91 and 
to Re Mbut placed a different focus to that previously applied 
in the Family Court. He reasoned that it was not the facts 
themselves which have to be "special" rather it was "the 
consequences and the predicament which must be examined"
92 
Judge Ellis stated that 93 
unusual consequences, or a predicament out of the ordinary, or 
a problem having relatively unusual features, may be created by 
a combination of factors in themselves not unusual .... It cannot 
be right to subject the facts in isolation to the test of 
"speciality" as if that were a separate step in the proceeding. 
The exercise ... is surely an integral one in which the 
particular circumstances are elements of a 'whole' which may, 
or may not, demand attention. 
Judge Ellis's approach to "special circumstances" purports to 
come within the Re Mand Gyselman reasoning. Judge Keane had 
referred to the "consequences" and the "predicament" as having 
to be beyond the usual. 94 In interpreting Gyselman Judge Ellis 
89 Above n79, 17. 
90 Above n79, 17. 
91 Above n79, 18. 
92 Above n7 9, 18. 
93 Above n79, 18-19. 
94 Above n4, 666-667. 
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saw the Court as not finding it necessary that the facts 
themselves be special but that the facts must establish 
something which is special or out of the ordinary. 
95 Judge 
Ellis is not then inconsistent with the letter of the Re M 
decision. Rather he moved the focus away from what could have 
become an overly narrow approach concentrating on the facts 
themselves, to an analysis which looked at the applicant's 
situation as a whole and recognized that a combination of quite 
ordinary factors could produce a result which was "special". 
The family court thus showed a division of opinion. Judge Keane 
in the Re M decision represented the "narrow gate" approach 
where the formula assessment is all but definitive. Judge 
Inglis QC pushed a much wider individualized line which focused 
on the particular facts of a specific case. Judge Ellis in 
Bradey came in between these two interpretations emphasising 
a holistic approach which looked at the predicament and 
consequences that the group of factors involved placed on an 
applicant. 96 It was this division which faced the Full Court 
of the High Court in hearing the appeal of Re M. 
VI SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE HIGH COURT 
APPEAL OF REM 
THE 
The appeal from the Family Court decision of Re M to the Full 
Court of the High Court was the first in relation to a 
departure order under the new Child Support legislation. The 
appeal was brought by the mother of a girl who was living with 
her father, a social welfare beneficiary. Judge Keane in the 
Family Court had refused to allow the application for a 
departure order97 and ultimately the High Court upheld that 
95 Above n79, 18. 
96 See also the approach of Judge O' Donovan in Cozens v 
Cozens Unreported, 17 September 1992, Family Court Auckland FP 
004/337/92, below Part VI. 
97 See above part V. 
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decision on appeal. 
because it was the 
The decision is of importance not only 
first of its type heard on appeal but 
principally because it purports to settle the interpretation 
of the phrase "special circumstances." 
Four essential points of law emerge in relation to the words 
"special circumstances." 
Firstly, the Full Court held that in emphasising paragraph (f) 
of section 4 (to provide legislatively fixed standards) His 
Honour Judge Keane had not overstated the position in saying 
that it was this object which set the Act apart. Rather it was 
a central feature of the legislation that child support 
liability was to be determined administratively by application 
of a legislative formula. The High Court accepted that the new 
Act was a "radical departure from previous philosophy" 98 and 
importantly endorsed Judge Keane's description of the 
departure process as a "narrow gate. 1199 
Secondly, the "interpretation and place of special 
circumstances 11 100 was considered. The Full Court looked at the 
decisions of Profitt v Police, Cortez Investments Ltd and 
Gyselman. Eichelbaum CJ and Heron J accepted that the Judge in 
the Family Court was correct to adopt the Gyselman approach. 
Further that "special circumstances" must be more than merely 
the set of facts pertaining to the case in hand. The facts must 
set the particular case apart from other cases. 101 This view, 
they held, followed logically from and was completely 
98 Re M [1993] NZFLR 74, 81 (HC). 
99 Above n98, 81. 
rejected the reasoning 
assessment should be 
appropriate instances" 
100 Above n98, 82. 
101 Above n98, 82. 
In doing so the High Court impliedly 
of Judge Inglis Qc that the formula 
departed from "not in limited but 
see above n68. 
II 
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consistent with the objectives of the legislation. 102 
Further, the Full court supported the proposition of Judge 
Keane that the "all to usual situation ... where income is just 
sufficient to meet outgoings, or does not quite suffice, cannot 
without more be regarded as special. 111 03 
In considering Cortez Investments Ltd it was held that the 
above approach was consistent with the view adopted by the 
Court of Appeal both that the phrase "special circumstances" 
is "wide comprehensive and flexible" and that the Court ought 
not lay down any exhaustive definitions. The caveat that 
"special" is less than "extraordinary or unique " 1 04 should 
also be kept in mind. 
Significantly, the High Court rejected the approach of his 
Honour Judge Inglis QC in H v Gas reading down the statutory 
requirement to simply "circumstances", giving no weight to the 
presence of the adjective "special". 105 Further, the Court 
rejected counsel's criticism that Judge Keane's use of 
expressions such as "remarkable" or "extreme" imposed a greater 
burden than was required. They accepted that the words taken 
by themselves could be regarded as setting a higher standard 
but having regard to the context of the Judge's remarks as a 
whole and the tests he postulated, the Court was satisfied 
Judge Keane did not pitch the search too high. 
102 The Full Court in looking at the objectives and 
philosophy of the legislation emphasised both the fixed and 
stringent nature of the formula and that in effect the statute 
was largely fiscal. See for example at page 85 where it is said 
" ... it is a matter of giving effect to the philosophy of the 
legislation that a more distinct proportion of the income of 
non-custodial parents should be devoted to the maintenance of 
their children than previously, and a lesser proportion of the 
responsibility should fall on the general body of taxpayers." 
103 Above n98, 82. 
104 Above n98, 82. 
105 Above n98, 82. 
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The third essential point that the High Court makes is that 
"unless the 'special circumstances' were something other than 
the possible consequences specified, the reference to special 
circumstances would be obtuse. . . more than the fact itself 
needs to be proved. 11 106 This simply endorses what Judge Keane 
said in the Family Court. 
Finally, the Full Court looked at the different ways "special 
circumstances" was expressed throughout section 105(2). Where 
paragraphs (a) and (c) open with the expression" by virtue of 
the special circumstances", while in (b) the reference is to 
"in the special circumstances of the case." However, Eichelbaum 
CJ and Heron J concluded that they were unable to see any 
difference of consequence and that it is "no more than a vagary 
of draughtsmanship. 111 0 7 
In essence the writer does not disagree with the general 
approach of the Full Court to "special circumstances". However, 
with respect the judgment is disappointing, and not completely 
conclusive, on several important issues relating to the meaning 
and application of "special circumstances". 
In endorsing Judge Keane's "narrow gate" approach the Court on 
appeal is consistent with the general nature of the Act's 
objectives and more specifically Parliament's intentions behind 
those objectives. Particularly that, as was discussed 
earlier, 1 0 8 object 4 (f) does seem more accurately than many of 
the more rights/obligations based objects to reflect the body 
of the legislation it prefaces. The Child Support Act 1991 
despite much of the rhetoric in section 4 is largely a fiscal 
statute. The Act does clearly enforce the financial duty that 
parents owe to their children. But importantly it also attempts 
106 Above n98, 83 . 
107 Above n98, 83. 
1 00 See above Part III. 
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to alleviate some of the burden of this duty off the general 
taxpayer. 
However, in supporting Judge Keane's approach that objective 
(f) set the Act apart, the High Court over looked several of 
the other relevant objects in section 4. 
In particular, as the nature of the application related to the 
applicant's income and commitments, the Court could have 
considered objects (d) (parents capacity to provide financial 
support) and (h) (equity between custodial and non-custodial 
parents regarding the costs of supporting the children) . 
Clearly, despite the aptness of 4(f) as a description of the 
statute, these other objectives are of importance in such a 
consideration on the facts of "special circumstances". The High 
Court also overstated the position in accepting that the new 
Act was a "radical departure from previous philosophy" given 
that the old Liable Parents Contribution Scheme was also 
calculated by the Director General of Social Welfare on the 
basis of the liable parent's taxable income and a formula. 
The comments of Bill English MP on the presentation of the 
Report of the Social Services Committee on the Child Support 
Bill that the departure order is a "safety valve" and applies 
where it is "obviously unjust", 109 reinforce the words of 
Judge Keane that the "formula answer ... is clearly intended to 
be definitive in all but a few cases. 11110 Thus, the general 
tenor of both decisions in Re M that departure orders will not 
be granted easily must be supported in light of the policy 
behind the statute. 111 
109 Above n15, 5987. Although 'injustice' is clearly not 
the test. 
110 Above n4, 663. 
111 Despite the appearance that the statute is largely 
fiscal in nature, Revenue Minister Wyatt Creech has stated that 
it is not a "revenue grabber". He has also said that the judges 
have been interpreting the Act much stricter than Parliament 
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Despite this conclusion, the reasoning of Judge Inglis QC in 
H v G which favoured a wider approach is very persuasive and 
respectfully should at least have been considered. Rather, the 
High Court justices did not even mention the obvious 
distinctions between the Australian and New Zealand formulae, 
that the former is based on both parent's income, and the 
latter on only that of the non-custodial parent. Potentially, 
this could have been a valid ground for distinguishing the 
Australian cases. 112 
The High Court interpretation of "special circumstances" as 
"facts peculiar to the particular case which set it apart from 
other cases" and "something out of the ordinary", is consistent 
with the approaches of Woodhouse P and McMullin Jin Cortez. 
However, if the comment of Richardson J that such phrases are 
simply synonyms which add little to the meaning of "special 
circumstances" is accepted, then what is left is the "interests 
of justice line" of the three Court of Appeal judges. With 
respect the Cortez case may have very little practical 
application given the totally different statutory contexts of 
the Law Practitioners Act and the Child Support Act. 113 
The Child Support legislation cannot fairly be described as a 
"liberal enactment " 114 designed for "consumer protection". 115 
intended. This is true to an extent but the comment of the 
Minister may be interpreted as political back-peddling in the 
light of rising dissatisfaction with the Act and an attempt to 
shift the focus of the blame onto judges. See Above n14, 54. 
112 A review of the Child Support Act undertaken in may of 
this year suggested that as a ground for distinction this 
difference between the formulas on either side of the Tasman 
may become obsolete. The Government indicated that part of the 
Child Support reforms (now after the election) will take 
account of the custodial parents income. See The Dominion, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 2 August 1993, 1 and 4 August 1993, 
4. 
113 This in fact what McMullin J warned in Cortez, see 
above Part IV. 
114 Above n27, 441. 
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Rather the Child Support Act attempts to enforce parental 
financial obligations to their children, in effect inducing 
"parents to alter their priorities". 116 Further, the 
"interests of justice" test is precluded by the nature of the 
Child Support Act. This is firstly because the Act provides 
specific grounds for departure. Secondly this is because the 
Child Support legislation has a three step test where 
considerations of whether the order is "just and equitable" and 
"otherwise proper" capture the "interests of justice" element. 
This must mean that "special circumstances" is a consideration 
separate from this. 
It is important that the Courts must pay more than lip service 
to the High Court caveat (taken from Cortez) that "special" is 
something less than "extraordinary or unique" . 117 For there 
may be a temptation that in applying the formula assessment in 
"all but a few cases" 118 , that the Courts may tend towards the 
"extraordinary" or "remarkable" tests. Clearly this is not the 
interpretation that the High Court endorses or indeed what 
Parliament intended; for the requirements for a departure order 
were expressly reduced from "extraordinary" to "special" in the 
select committee process. 119 
What was disappointing in the High Court's acceptance of the 
Gyselman approach is that the decision of Judge Ellis in Bradey 
was not discussed by the Court. For the observations of Judge 
Ellis can provide a "helpful corrective to an approach that 
would assess 'special circumstances' by comparison with 
115 Above n27, 439 Richardson J. 
116 Above n98, 85, 
117 Above n98, 83. 
118 Above n4, 663. 
119 Above n15, 5987. 
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stereotypical situations or classes of case" . 120 Judge Ellis 
emphasised the consequences and the predicament created by the 
circumstances and that the exercise in testing for speciality 
should be an integral one. 121 These are useful provisos which 
may allow issues of overall justice to come into the test of 
speciality without derogating from the High Court 
interpretation. For Bradey is not essentially inconsistent 
with Re M. It just concentrated on different aspects of the 
Gyselman approach to justify the conclusion that the test 
should look at all the facts and the affects those facts 
produce, rather than to see if a particular fact was or was not 
"special". 
Also problematic is the Full Court's decision that "special 
circumstances" must be something other than the grounds for 
departure themselves. If in stating this, the Court means that 
a departure order will not be granted merely if the specified 
ground is satisfied, then this seems consistent with 
Parliament's intention in imposing the standard of "special 
circumstances". However, if (as it looks like is the case) 
something extra is required, that the circumstances need to be 
independent of the ground to satisfy the requirement of 
"special", then the Court was imposing an unnecessarily harsh 
hurdle and one which was not inevitably indicated by the 
wording of the statute. It appears completely consistent with 
the terms and context of section 105(2) that the grounds for 
departure themselves can constitute "special circumstances" as 
long as the facts (or the consequences /predicament) are 
"special" or "out of the ordinary run". For example, if under 
section 105 ( 2) ( c) (ii) , a non-custodial parent has made a 
previous contribution which is out of the ordinary (in that it 
is very large) in favour of the custodial parent which creates 
an inequity between the two, the question remains why in terms 
120 Wood v Wood Unreported, 7 December 1992, Family Court 
Levin CS 031/147/92, Judge Inglis QC, 16. 
121 Above n79, 18-19. 
29 
of the High Court judgment, can this situation not be regarded 
as "special" ? 1 2 2 Similar arguments can be made in relation to 
departure applications for high costs of access (and various 
of the other grounds) . 123 
The final point is really one of statutory interpretation. It 
relates to the High Court's over abrupt dismissal of the 
differences between paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) as simply a 
vagary of draughtsmanship. Illuminating is the discussion of 
the differences in drafting by Judge O'Donovan in the 
unreported decision of Cozens v Cozens and CIR. 124 In that 
case his Honour compared the New Zealand statute to the 
Australian equivalent. The Australian Act refers only to "in 
the special circumstances of the case" and not to the phrase 
"by virtue of the special circumstances". The New Zealand 
legislation is not the same as the Australian "unless of course 
one is able to say that, despite their apparent differences, 
the words used in each subparagraph really amount to the same 
thing". 125 This is a proposition which Judge O' Donovan could 
not accept. In Cozens his Honour posed a crucial question which 
the High Court left unanswered. At page 5 he asked126 
Why else would parliament go to the trouble of expressing itself 
in different ways unless it intended the test to be different, 
particularly when Parliament must have had before it the 
equivalent Australian legislation? It seems indeed that a 
deliberate attempt has been made to alter the position in New 
Zealand from that in Australia. 
122 See below Part VII. 
123 See below part VI I . 
12 4 Unreported, 1 7 September 1992, Family Court Auckland FP 
004/337/92, 3-6. 
125 Above n124, 5. 
126 Above nl24, 5. 
Was it intended 
subparagraphs (a), 
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that different tests be applied to 
(c) and (b)? The High Court decision makes 
it clear that a universal standard is to be applied to all of 
the three groups. 
With respect the High Court took the easy way out in putting 
the differences down to the vagaries of drafting and side-
stepped the true application that Parliament intended for the 
respective categories of grounds. 
Judge O' Donovan suggested that the phrase "in the special 
circumstances of the case" meant no more than the grounds 
contained in subparagraph (b) are to be viewed in light of the 
facts of the particular case. This is similar to the Judge 
Inglis interpretation of "special circumstances" in H v G. His 
Honour Judge O'Donovan viewed the other phrase ("by virtue ... 
") used in (a) and (c) as meaning that circumstances which are 
special, in the sense of being out of the ordinary, need to be 
demonstrated. 127 This approach is problematic because the 
Australian Courts have interpreted the former phrase "in the 
special circumstances of the case" as meaning out of the 
ordinary. This suggests Judge O'Donovan may have got the tests 
around the wrong way but at least he was not simply ignoring 
the differences in drafting. 
VII THE FAMILY COURTS AFTER REM - THE APPLICATION 
OF THE HIGH COURT DECISION 
Essentially there is no noticeable difference in departure 
orders before and after the High Court decision in Re M. This 
is not surprising as many Family Court judges in New Zealand 
were following Judge Keane's interpretation anyway. 
One key area of departure orders that has continued to operate 
outside the ambit of how the High Court interpreted "special 
127 Above n124, 4. 
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circumstances" is in relation to applications under section 
105 (2) (b) (i) 
105 (2) (c) (ii) 
settlements. 
high costs of access; and under section 
previous matrimonial property (and other) 
The Courts here have often granted orders despite the fact that 
in essence it is only the ground itself that has been 
established and nothing extra. 
In departure orders purporting to establish high costs of 
access, the applicant must show that in terms of section 
105(3), the costs of access enabling access 
threshold. As with all the grounds, an applicant 
to show "special circumstances". If the 
reach a 5 % 
is required 
High Court 
interpretation is accepted these circumstances must be 
something other than the ground itself. However, what was 
happening before Re M(HC) and what to a large extent is still 
happening, is that if an applicant shows they can meet the 5 % 
threshold then that in itself will often be enough to satisfy 
the requirements of "special circumstances". 
In Adams v Adams and CIR12 8 the applicant satisfied the 5% 
threshold. Judge Frater said "special circumstances" existed 
because one parent lived in Wainuiomata and the other, with the 
children, lived in Christchurch. The order was unsuccessful but 
only because Her Honour Judge Frater held it was not "otherwise 
proper" to grant a departure. This case and a long list of 
others like it (often with significantly less distance to 
travel) 1 2 9 show the Courts willingness to find "special 
circumstances" if the 5% level is reached. 
128 Unreported, Heard 14 October 1992 (decided after Re M 
in the High Court), Family Court Lower Hutt FP 226/92, Judge 
Frater. 
1 2 9 For example see Kenning v Reynard [1993] NZFLR 402, 
where the distance was from Tauranga to Auckland; Webby v Webby 
Unreported, 2 January 1993, Family Court FP 016/182/92, Judge 
Evans, where the applicant had to travel from Gisborne to 
Rotorua; White v White Unreported, 10 December 1992, Family 
Court North Shore FP 196/86, where access was exercised between 
Auckland and Ngaruawahia . 
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Arguably, the very nature of high costs of access being 5 % or 
more of your child support income means the applicant must 
either travel often to visit or travel over long distances (or 
both). Surely, if either of these two requisites are inherently 
necessary in establishing high access, then they only go 
towards creating the ground and cannot without more be regarded 
as "special" if the analysis is to stay within the High Court's 
decision. Thus, when Judge Frater held that the travel between 
Christchurch and Wainuiomata was a "special circumstance", she 
was at odds with the High Court decision. In effect these facts 
only went to establish the ground itself. 
The anomaly is highlighted when the case of Grant v Ulph 130 is 
compared with that of Adams and others like it. In Grant, His 
Honour Judge Carruthers correctly followed the High Court 
decision finding that the ground for high access was 
established (with the 5% threshold) and that in addition there 
was a "special circumstance" as to that ground. That "special 
circumstance" was the mental and developmental problems of the 
child which meant that he "has a very special interest beyond 
what is ordinary in maintaining a sensitive and healthy contact 
with his father". 131 
Judge Carruthers disjunctive approach is arguably how the High 
Court intended the test for speciality to be applied. Even 
though the approach of Judge Frater may be fairer to the 
applicant, it is not strictly within the meaning of "special 
circumstances" as interpreted in the High Court. 
Similar arguments can be made in relation to matrimonial 
settlements before the Act came into force. In these situations 
many judges are finding "special circumstances" simply because 
of "the significant size of the imbalance (in settlement) seen 
13 0 Unreported, 7 April 1993, Family Court Wellington CS 
4/93, Judge Carruthers. 
131 Above n130, 6. 
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against a right to equity of division... expressed in the 
Matrimonial Property Act". 132 Again this approach is fairer 
but in basic terms the applicant has satisfied the ground only 
by showing an inequity in division of property. Even if that 
division is significant, it is still not a "special 
circumstance" in the sense of something extra. 
A recent decision in the Family Court by His Honour Judge 
Inglis QC gives an interesting insight into the High Court 
decision. In effect Ruru v Waddell and CIR133 comes to similar 
conclusions as the line of matrimonial property cases. That is, 
if there is a significant imbalance then this may be sufficient 
to satisfy "special circumstances". However, the reasoning of 
Judge Inglis QC articulated the steps which led to these 
conclusions and provides both a fairer and less orthodox 
interpretation of the High Court decision. 
The applicant sought a departure order under section 
105 ( 2) ( c) (iii) . The applicant's former de facto and two 
children retained the sole occupation of his home at a nominal 
rent of twenty dollars a week. The home was on Maori land and 
the applicant wanted the children to retain strong ties with 
the whanau. In addition, the applicant was paying the major 
outgoings on that home . 
Judge Inglis QC began from the proposition that the formula 
assessment model was limited to an income earning liable parent 
and a custodial parent whose income is irrelevant . 1 3 4 The 
model does not include provision by the liable parent of a home 
for the custodial parent and the children. To that extent the 
applicant does not match the formula model. This anomaly, 
132 Seri vener v Seri vener Unreported, 8 September 1992, 
Family Court Christchurch CS 009/661/92, Judge Strettell, 11 . 
133 Unreported, 2 April 1993, Family Court Levin CS 
031/160/92. 
134 Above nl 33, 4 . 
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reasoned Judge Inglis QC, is recognized as a ground for 
departure. 
The essence of counsel for the Commissioner's submission was 
that the existence of the anomaly cannot in itself be "special 
circumstances''. This was because the nature of the anomaly was 
recognized by the specified ground for departure . Thus, the 
"special circumstances" must be circumstances independent of 
that substantive ground for a departure order application. 135 
This is a standa~d interpretation of the High Court decision 
that "special circumstances" must be something other than the 
possible consequences specified in section 105(2). 
However, Judge Inglis QC rejected this argument. He held 
that136 
it may remain possible to argue that the phrase 'special 
circumstances' was intended to do no more than to 
emphasize that the degree of anomaly revealed by 
comparing relevant features of the applicant's situation 
with the formula assessment model has to be a truly 
significant degree of anomaly in order to justify 
departure. 
His Honour saw nothing in Re Mor the objectives of the Act 
inconsistent with the above view. 137 
Judge Inglis QC rejected counsel's submission that the 
comparison involved in analysing "special circumstances" lay 
not with the formula model generally but with those cases where 
the liable parent has left the custodial parent in sole 
occupation of the matrimonial home. He held it was illogical 
and restrictive to argue that the circumstances must be outside 
the ordinary run of cases where the custodial parent retained 
135 Above n133, 5. 
136 Above n133, 5. 
13 7 Above n133, 5-6. 
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that sole occupation. 13 8 
His Honour followed the approach of Judge Ellis in Bradey v 
Bradey and CIR. He stated that the correct approach to "special 
circumstances" requires an "assessment of the degree to which 
the parties' circumstances deviate from the formula assessment 
model and, detailed assessment of the particular predicament 
of the particular parties and the particular consequences for 
them if the formula assessment is or is not upheld" . 139 
(emphasis added) 
In rejecting the argument that the anomaly in itself cannot be 
"special circumstances", Judge Inglis QC was taking a wider 
view of the High Court decision in Re M. He accepted that it 
must logically follow that "special circumstances" should be 
something other than the possible consequences specified in the 
ground. But he stated that it did not follow that, in assessing 
whether there are "special circumstances", the circumstances 
relied on must be entirely disregarded. 140 
In relation to an application under section 105 (2) (c) (iii) 
Judge Inglis QC agreed that the ground is only established if 
it is shown that the respondent's and the children's occupation 
of the home results in application of the formula assessment 
being "unjust and inequitable" as a determination of the level 
of financial support required by the applicant. 141 However, he 
went on to hold that "the demonstrated degree of injustice and 
inequity must ... be an important element in determining whether 
the circumstances are indeed special". 142 
138 Above nl33, 6. 
139 Above nl33, 13. 
14 0 Above nl33, 13. 
141 Above nl33, 14. 
142 Above nl33, 14. 
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The conclusion that a significant degree of anomaly in 
comparison to the formula model can satisfy "special 
circumstances", is a fairer approach for the applicant. It 
ameliorates the harshness of the interpretation which would 
require something extra for the circumstances to be special. 
Further the reasoning of Judge Inglis QC provides a 
justification for the "significant size of the imbalance" line 
in the matrimonial settlement cases. 
Despite being potentially fairer to future applicants and 
showing one way to apply the Bradey "predicament" and 
"consequences" test, Ruru is not completely consistent with Re 
M. Judge Inglis QC is undoubtedly correct in stating that the 
words "the special circumstances must be something other than 
the possible consequence specified in the ground for 
departure" 143 do not by necessity mean that "the circumstances 
relied upon to bring the case within a particular ground for 
departure must be entirely disregarded" . 144 (emphasis added) 
But he goes beyond the interpretation in Re Min suggesting 
that the phrase "special circumstances" was intended to do no 
more than emphasise that the degree of anomaly has to be a 
truly significant degree to justify a departure. 145 The 
"degree of anomaly" is a relevant consideration in the 
assessment of "special circumstances". It is probably one 
Parliament intended although it does not come wholly within the 
Re M approach. 
In Re M the High Court used as an example the first ground for 
departure. The Full Court stated that an applicant relying on 
it must show more than that their capacity to provide financial 
143 Above n98, 83. 
144 Above n133, 14. 
145 Above n133, 5. 
I 
37 
support is significantly reduced because of their duty to 
maintain another child. 146 For this could be said in the 
majority of situations where a parent had more than one child 
to support. The circumstances must be special and more than the 
fact itself needs to be proved. 147 Surely what the High Court 
is saying here is exactly what counsel for the Commissioner 
argued in Ruru, namely that the existence of the anomaly cannot 
in itself be special. Even in the High Court example a 
"significant degree of anomaly" would not suffice because the 
ground itself states that an applicant's financial capacity 
must be "significantly" affected. On the High Court's reasoning 
more than a significant reduction was required. 
Judge Inglis QC's analysis that the applicant is relying on 
injustice and inequity to establish the ground and the degree 
of the in justice and inequity as an element of "special 
circumstances" is persuasive and follows logically from the 
objects of the Act. 148 The notion that the degree of injustice 
and inequity is to be measured in all the surrounding 
circumstances and against the degree to which the parties 
situation deviates from the formula model may be a test which 
comes within the words "something other than the possible 
consequences specified" . 149 However, if these words are 
considered in the context of the rest of the High Court 
judgment and in particular the example cited above, the 
"significant degree of anomaly" test seems to go beyond the 
High Court interpretation. 
146 Above n98, 83. 
147 Above n98, 83. 
148 Above n133, 15. 
149 Above n98, 83. 
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VIII THE HIGH COURT REVISITED: PATRICK V BOXEN AND 
WILCOX V LYON 
Subsequent to Re M, two more appeals have been heard in the 
High Court. Patrick v Boxen150 and Wilcox v Lyon151 are the 
most recent pronouncements on "special circumstances being 
decided in July and August of this year. Neither case rejected 
the basic approach in Re Mbut both decisions came to different 
conclusions as to t~e nature of the Full Court's test. 
In Patrick v Boxen, Temm J rejected the appeal of a custodial 
parent whose CTaintenance was reduced from six hundred dollars 
every four weeks to three hundred and thirty eight dollars a 
month by the child support formula. Prior to the Child Support 
Act, the parents had come to a mutual agreement that the father 
would pay one hundred and fifty dollars a week for the two 
children. With the father using the child support formula, the 
mother claimed a deficit of about eighty four dollars a week. 
The judge ignored the fact that the combined income of the 
liable parent and his new wife was seventy one thousand five 
hundred dollars. 
Temm J approved of Re M. In doing so he stated that the 
important point about the Full Court's interpretation which 
needed emphasis was that those who object to an assessment and 
seek relief, must take their case "to the point where it is 
quite out of the ordinary and where the case can properly be 
described as being set apart from other cases. " 152 (emphasis 
added) This imposed a higher standard than the Court in Re M 
intended. The test of the Full Court was whether the facts 
established something which was special or out of the ordinary, 
not "quite" out of the ordinary, as Temm J said. 
150 Unreported, 6 July 1993, High Court Auckland HC 4/93. 
151 Unreported, 3 August 1993, High Court Christchurch AP 
164/93. 
152 Above n150, 7. 
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In support of the above statement, the judge cited the passage 
from Re M where the Court held that the expressions such as 
"remarkable" or "extreme" used by Keane J may have seemed to 
impose a greater burden than was required but in the context 
of the Judge's remarks as a whole, the test was not too high. 
However, the context of Temm J's judgment did impose a greater 
burden than was required. In particular, the Judge cited with 
approval an observation from the Family Court which did pose 
the test too high. Temm J saw the Family Court Judge as 
perfectly correct in stating " (w) hat I think she would be 
required to shoe is that there existed some liability or 
obligation which committed her to a quite extraordinary 
extent .... " 153 (emphasis added) With respect this statement 
takes no regard of the Full Court's caveat that "special" is 
something less than "extraordinary" or "unique" . 154 
Temm J's approach was coloured by the way he viewed the Act 
itself. He saw the Child Support Act as having the hallmarks 
of revenue and taxation legislation. 155 Further, of the Act's 
eleven objects the Judge only mentioned one, object 4 (f) 
"legislatively fixed standards". Although Temm J is correct in 
identifying the fiscal nature of the statute, he completely 
ignored one fundamental purpose of the Act, to protect the 
financial interests of the child. 156 Like the Justices in the 
Full Court, Temm J did not give adequate consideration to any 
of the Act's other objectives. 157 This point is highlighted by 
another passage from the Family Court judgment which Temm J 
believed was appropriate and right. Namely, that it is not 
153 Above nlSO, 9. 
154 See above Part VI 
155 Above nlSO, 1. 
156 See above Part III. 
1 57 See above Part VI. 
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enough to say that: 158 
the objects of the Act require a liable parent to maintain a 
child as much as they can. The Act does not say that. It 
says that the obligation is to maintain up to a statutory 
level and only beyond where there are special circumstances 
pertaining to any of the matters set out in section 105 
which justify departure. 
This statement is correct to an extent but it was blind to 
object 4(j) which does say clearly say that a "fair 
contribution" is required. Before the Child Support Act the 
parties had agreed that six hundred dollars every four weeks 
was a fair contribution. Since the passing of the Act the non-
custodial parent had obviously used the formula to reduce his 
liability which was patently unfair to the mother and the 
children she cared for. 
The final point of interest from the somewhat brief judgment 
of Temrn J is that the judge has serious reservations about 
Judge Inglis QC's approach in Ruru v Waddell. However, he does 
not indicate why he doubts this case. 
A much fuller judgment from Tipping Jin Wilcox v Lyon revealed 
a greater underlying sympathy for departure order applicants. 
The mother and child lived in Scotland with the mother's 
partner. The father lived in New Zealand, al though he was 
originally from the United States. The non-custodial parent was 
a biological father only as the child had been born from a 
brief relationship and father and son had had no contact 
whatsoever. Plans to adopt the child had not been pursued by 
the mother. The father's level of payments rose under a formula 
assessment from ten dollars a week to one hundred and fifty six 
dollars a week. In addition, at the age of fifty, he and his 
wife had just acquired their first home with a substantial 
mortgage. The appeal by the father was allowed. 
The Judge agreed with Re M that the expressions "by virtue of 
158 Above n150, 9. 
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special circumstances" and" in the special circumstances of 
the case" convey the same idea. even if Tipping J and the Full 
Court are correct, j_t was still disappointing that the High 
Court had still not given any reasons to support the conclusion 
that subparagraphs (a), (c) and (b) were not intended to denote 
any different interpretations. 159 
However, Tipping J did go along way towards clarifying a 
troubling point in Re M. The Full Court had held that "special 
circumstances" must be something other than the possible 
consequences specified in the ground for departure. 160 This 
had led to problems in the Family Courts as can be seen by 
Judge Inglis QC'S "significant degree of anomaly" test in Ruru 
and the line of high access and settlement cases discussed 
above. 161 
Tipping J made it clear that "special circumstances" do not 
have to be extraneous to the grounds for departure. He stated 
that: 162 
kind. 
when the Full Court spoke of 'something other' than the possible 
consequences specified I do not consider they meant something 
quite separate and apart from those consequences .... They can 
be extraneous ... but they do not have to be. They can equally 
relate to the ground so as to make it a special case of its 
Put at its simplest level, it is enough for the applicant to 
show 
something in the ground alleged which is a special rather than 
an 
ordinary manifestation of the ground. 
This was very similar to what Judge Inglis QC said in Ruru and 
159 See above Pa.rt VI. 
160 Above n98, 83. 
161 See above Part VII. 
162 Above nl51, 6. 
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what Judge Ellis said in Bradey. In Ruru the Judge had said 
that it did not follow that just because "special 
circumstances" must be something other than the ground for 
departure that the circumstances relied upon to bring the case 
within a particular ground should be entirely disregarded. 163 
In Bradey Judge Ellis had emphasised that the approach to 
departure order applications was an integral one in which the 
particular circumstances are elements of a whole. 164 Tipping 
J's judgment favours this holistic analysis and should put an 
end to the idea that something extra is required before 
"special circumstances" are satisfied. In addition it will give 
some certainty to those cases where there is a significant 
degree of anomaly (in comparison with the formula assessment 
model) as these cases could be classified as "special case(s) 
of (their) kind." 
Despite being more sympathetic to the applicant in his approach 
to "special circumstances", Tipping J made some telling, yet 
accurate, observations about the nature of departure orders. 
The Judge agreed with the Full Court's description of the 
criteria for a departure application as a "narrow gate". His 
Honour stated that Parliament had deliberately made the gate 
narrow. 165 That the policy of the Act was to ensure that the 
formula assessment applied unless "special circumstances" could 
be shown. Further, the fact that Parliament placed a series of 
"cumulative hurdles " 166 in an applicants path, namely the need 
to show an order was "just and equitable", "otherwise proper' 
and that "special circumstances" existed, made it clear that 
departure orders were not to be lightly granted. Importantly 
though Tipping J added to this the Full Court's warning that 
there is no need to impose on the applicant the requirement to 
163 Above n133, 14 and see above Part VII. 
164 Above n79, 18-19. 
165 Above nlSl, 7. 
166 Above nlSl, 7. 
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demonstrate that the case was unique or extraordinary. 
IX CONCLUSION 
The old Liable Parent Contribution scheme administered by the 
Department of Social Welfare was regarded by many as toothless. 
It was estimated that only a third of liable parents were 
paying their full share. 167 Thus, it was not surprising that 
a more stringent system with a rigid formula assessment was 
introduced under the control of the Inland Revenue Department. 
It is part and parcel of legislation of this kind that it has 
affected some people more harshly than others and that in some 
cases it has caused hardship. The departure order is supposed 
to be the "safety valve" of the system. It is Parliament's 
recognition that the formula assessment model, no matter how 
all-encompassing, simpJ.y will not be applicable in all cases. 
However, hardship and injustice are not grounds for departure 
and Bill English MP was patently incorrect when he stated to 
the House that the departure order was the court's 
discretionary tool for situations where the formula is 
"obviously unjust". 168 The departure application system is 
much narrower than a discretionary test of justice and the High 
Court was correct to categorize it as a "narrow gate". 
Parliament had deliberately made the gate narrow by placing the 
three "cumulative hurdles " 169 ("special circumstances" with 
the specified ground; evidence that an order would be "just and 
equitable" and "otherwise proper") in an applicants path. 
The very nature of the departure process suggested that 
deviations from the formula assessment were not to be granted 
lightly. The three tier test reinforced Parliament's message 
to non-custodial parents that it was serious about obtaining 
167 w Barton "Getting parents to pay for 
Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, June 30 1993, 
168 Above n15, 5987. 
169 Above nl51, 7. 
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a "fair contribution" towards offsetting the cost of the 
Domestic Purposes Benefit on the tax payer. 
The other central message of the Child Support Act was 
accurately summarized by Principle Family Court Judge Mahony 
in Andrews v Andrews17 0 where he said: 
Parliament is giving a clear indication to liable parents that 
their obligation to support their children must be very high on 
their list of priorities when they are ordering their financial 
affairs. . . . 
Of the three hurdles "special circumstances had proved to be 
the highest and hardest to get over in the courts. 
The context of the Child Support Act precluded the Court of 
Appeal's observation in Cortez that in considering "special 
circumstances" the interests of justice must govern. This test 
may have been appropriate to the liberal and protective Law 
Practitioners Act but under the child support legislation 
issues of overall justice do not come into consideration until 
the second hurdle. 
Although it was relatively easy for the courts to conclude that 
"special circumstances" meant that something out of the 
ordinary run had to be shown, beyond that there was a division 
of opinion. Despite the observations of the Court of Appeal 
that "special circumstances" are wide comprehensive and 
flexible words, the majority of the Family Court applied the 
phrase narrowly. The Full Court of the High Court's endorsement 
of the narrow approach potentially lifted the hurdle Parliament 
had set and placed it higher. 
Despite the prominence of the narrow approach and the High 
Court's support of it, various judges showed an underlying 
sympathy for those seeking departure orders. There was still 
a division of opinion as to how "special circumstances" should 
170 Unreported, 11 August 1992, Family Court Nelson CS 
042/196/92, 3. 
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be applied. Several judges showed that if the ground were 
established and there was a sufficient imbalance or a 
"significant degree of anomaly" in comparison with the formula 
assessment model then this was sufficient to satisfy the test. 
Most notable of these was the decision of Judge Inglis QC in 
Ruru v Waddell. 
The fact that "special circumstances" in the context of the 
Child Support Act was problematic was highlighted by the two 
recent High Court decisions. One of which, Patrick, in a case 
which cried out for justice and equity, appeared to push the 
test of speciality closer to that of "extraordinary". The 
other, Wilcox, revealed a sensible and sympathetic approach. 
Tipping J recognized the stringent limitations imposed by 
Parliament. But he clarified what had developed into an 
unnecessarily harsh application of Re M by concluding that 
"special circumstances" did not have to be extraneous to the 
ground, they could simply show a special case of its kind. 
Although Tipping J's analysis makes good sense and together 
with Ellis J's and Judge Inglis QC's approaches may ameliorate 
some of the harshness of the departure application process, the 
system for relief is still overly complicated and restrictive. 
Indeed there is a serious difficulty with "special 
circumstances" as an initial hurdle in the context of this Act. 
The requirement to show something "special", even just "a 
special case of its kind", unnecessarily eliminates some 
applicants who may be worthy of relief. Pamela Patrick was a 
prime example where "special circumstances" got in the way of 
a deserved departure order. 
The grounds for departure are limited enough themselves. If 
Parliament intended to give the courts discretion in this area 
so as to alleviate some of the harshness of the formula then 
it would have been more useful to exclude "special 
circumstances" all together. Tipping J in Wilcox showed that 
the question of whether an order is "just and equitable" is a 
46 
comprehensive test which embodies an extensive list of 
considerations . 171 It includes the objects of the Act, the 
proper needs of the child, relevant financial resources and 
commitments of all parties as well as issues of hardship. The 
second and third hurdles are holistic considerations which call 
for the balance of the needs of the children, parents and the 
state. It is these tests of justice and equity and what is 
otherwise proper that are more appropriate in the context of 
the child support legislation than the need to show "special 
circumstances". For al though the Act is largely fiscal, the 
financial interests of the child must be a paramount 
consideration and the nature of the test of speciality in the 
Act does not always allow this to be the case. 
171 See slOS (4). 
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